Man as Social Animal: Aristotle vs. Hobbes

Cicero Denounces Catiline [detail] fresco by Cesare Maccari

Introduction

Two of the most influential political theorists in human history were Aristotle and Thomas Hobbes, each being the father of a political school(s) of thought that shaped mankind thereafter. Though separated by centuries, Aristotle and Hobbes are separated more profoundly in their respective doctrines. Their differences are on the level of the fundamental to such an extent that one can claim that they stand on opposite ends of a spectrum, particularly in their philosophy of man and the ends for which man exists and acts. For Aristotle, man is naturally a social and, therefore, political animal ‒man is ordered toward the community. For Hobbes, man is anything but ‒man is naturally ordered toward the the individual, and that individual is himself.

But which one is right? Is Aristotle the the disconnected idealist and Hobbes the one grounded in observational reality; or, is Aristotle seeing past the evident corruption to the true nature of men and society, and Hobbes just steeped too much in the puritanical tea of the age in which he wrote? Well, we observe men voluntarily acting for a common good; we also observe men behaving selfishly. If forced to choose between these two philosophers, Aristotle is to be preferred ‒man is a social animal, for though Hobbes makes certain real and accurate observations on the behavior and nature of man, the latter, due to his fundamental epistemological and metaphysical denials, fails to see the inherent goodness of human nature and the good to which it is naturally ordered. As a result of these fundamental errors, Hobbes stitches together his own monstrosity of a political doctrine in his Leviathan in which, if accurate, man's life would truly be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."¹ Let us first examine Aristotle's views in summary, then Hobbes', and finally engage in the comparative analysis.

Aristotle

Aristotle: man as social/political animal in the Politics.

Hence it is evident that a city is a natural production, and that man is naturally a political [social] animal.

‒Aristotle, Politics, 1253a3.

Aristotle's entire political treatise is built upon his his ethical, anthropological, and natural philosophy. In short: nature acts for an end; that end is the good and it is common, i.e. not diminished for others when had; the common good is predicated of the individual good to such an extent that the individual good is intrinsically tied to the good of the community; and the end of man can only be achieved by virtuous and lawful behavior. Thus the Politics entirely depends upon the idea that man is a social animal, and Aristotle devotes the first considerations of his treatise to this point.

He builds up to this fundamental concept by presenting to us a layered hierarchy of human and natural associations or societies, one connected to another and subordinated by nature to the whole in a similar way that the various parts of the body form and are subordinated to the good of the whole body.² From lowest to highest, the natural associations are: 1.) personal associations (as St. Thomas summarizes it³), 2.) households or families, 3.) villages (or neighborhoods), and, finally, 4.) the state/city itself which is the political/social (societal) community.

Aristotle clearly points to the observable fact that individuals cannot exist without others to help them fulfill their own, individual, and most fundamental ends. This insufficiency is the cause of the first natural association: that between man and woman. From there, new and higher associations are naturally produced to fulfill the hierarchy of ends for man ‒the lowest being fundamental existence to the highest which is happiness, for "living well" presupposes that one's basic needs are first fulfilled. The "personal association" of man and woman produces the "household" or "family" so as to fulfill the daily needs of basic subsistence and existence. The households grow and multiply over time to produce the next natural association: the "village", where the non-daily needs of man are fulfilled, and where households first encounter the production of other households which contribute to ends higher than fundamental existence. As households naturally grow and multiply, so too the villages. This leads Aristotle to the culminating point of his argument that the state is a natural association:

And when many villages so entirely join themselves together as in every respect to form but one society, that society is a city, and contains in itself, if I may so speak, the end and perfection of government: first founded that we might live, but continued that we may live happily. For which reason every city must be allowed to be the work of nature, if we admit that the original society between male and female is; for to this as their end all subordinate societies tend, and the end of everything is the nature of it. For what every being is in its most perfect state, that certainly is the nature of that being, whether it be a man, a horse, or a house: besides, whatsoever produces the final cause and the end which we desire, must be best; but a government complete in itself is that final cause and what is best.

‒Aristotle, Politics, 1252b28-1253a2.

When villages begin to associate, this produces Aristotle's state/city (polis), which, due to the combined efforts of the many villages and households, all the natural ends of man are fulfilled (i.e. self-sufficieny or sustainability is achieved) to achieve his ultimate end: happiness. Furthermore, as each association naturally has its ruler, so too does the state, for the ruler imposes law and thus maintains an orderly framework where those within the association can live with (relative) tranquility to achieve the ends proper to the association governed. Thus, each association differs not only in degree but in kind, as each has a different proximate end. But the proximate end of the state is also the final end of men. Therefore, all men are ordered toward the political community by their nature as it (the state) is that which best achieves the natural, final end of man.⁴

To summarize Aristotle's argument, as nature (essence) is the end ‒the that-for-the-sake-of-which a thing comes to be‒ and as man is insufficient of his individual self to accomplish the perfection of his nature, his nature can only be completed or best accomplished in an association that has self-sufficiency or complete sustainability as its end. That final association is the city or state, that to which, then, man naturally tends from his first personal association. And that which produces the final cause (on the natural level) is supreme. To put it another way, that which is most proximate to the final cause is highest. Since nature acts for an end, man is by nature a political (social) animal.⁵

As a corollary to this, Aristotle points out that if a man is not politically/socially inclined, he must be either sub-human or quasi-divine. Leaving the quasi-divine idea aside, a non/anti-social man must be quarrelsome and solitary, i.e, if he is not political/social by nature, then his "nature" is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and [will probably be] short." His warlike, solitary nature is "unnatural" (so to speak), not inclined to human nature's proper end, for nature does nothing vainly; and man, above all other animals, has the power of reason as is evidenced in his power of speech by which he communicates his ideas to achieve his ends. Thus, by virtue of reason, Aristotle asserts that man is the most political/social of all animals, for it is only the reason that can comprehend the end and direct one or many towards it.⁶ And the end or good of man is "happiness/the good life/living well" which consists of:

...an activity of the soul according to virtue, and, if the virtues are many, then according to the best and most complete virtue....What should prevent us, then from saying that a man is happy when he acts in accordance with complete virtue and is sufficiently furnished with external goods?

‒Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a17, 1101a15.

Thomas Hobbes

Thomas Hobbes: man not as social animal in the Leviathan.

The final cause, end, or design of men, who naturally love liberty, and dominion over others, in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, in which we see them live in commonwealths [the state], is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out of that miserable condition of war, which is necessarily consequent...to the natural passions of men, when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants, and observation of those laws of nature.

‒Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, chapter 17.

Hobbes political philosophy is the antithesis to Aristotle's teachings. In fact, Hobbes devotes the entire 17th chapter of the Leviathan to point-by-point arguments explicitly against Aristotle's writings addressed above. Yet this chapter is also a summarization of his treatment of man which leads him to this alternate consideration of the commonwealth/state ‒man, for Hobbes, is not a social animal, and, as a consequence, the political community is not natural. Let us examine the principal points which led him to these assertions.

Hobbes axiomatically reworks (rejects) classical (and scholastic) philosophy by positing empiricist, mechanistic, and nominalist principles from which to work: e.g. imagination is nothing other than decaying sense⁷; science is merely the knowable consequence of sensed and remembered antecedent facts⁸; thoughts are regulated by desire⁹; the will is nothing other than the last appetite prior to action¹⁰; truth is really the proper ordering of nomenclature¹¹; understanding is nothing but a conception in the mind caused by speech¹²; reasoning is nothing other than a mathematical exercise of addition and subtraction¹³; to think one can speak of immaterial realities is absurdity¹⁴; we can have no real or useful natural knowledge of God¹⁵; all men are equal, not just insofar as they have the same nature, but in the powers of the mind and body¹⁶; etc.

These premises serve as the backdrop and foundation to Hobbes political doctrines. We cannot really know the immaterial causes of things, our naming of them being absurdities. Nor can we trace back from effect to cause and have a real or meaningful knowledge of God or His existence. As a consequence, though there may be a natural law, man can have no meaningful understanding of it in such wise as to base his morality in it. Man desires the good, but not because they are good in themselves, but because it is desirable, it is called "good". That which is detested is called "evil". We know from our senses about sensible (or at least quantifiable) things; and, our desire drives the reasoning process, a mere exercise in computation, in achieving what one desires ‒the sensible "good"‒ or avoiding what one dislikes ‒the sensible "evil".

Then what makes us moral? Nothing. The State of Nature¹⁷ is that of every man for himself ‒the antithesis of the concept of man as social animal. For "men have no pleasure, but on the contrary a great deal of grief, in keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe them all."¹⁸ This warlike state is due to men's equality and his Rights of Nature¹⁹ which gives him absolute liberty to do what he will for his own preservation, even "to one another's body".²⁰ And so, if there is nothing to inhibit a man in the state of nature to do whatever he wills to procure his own desired ends, nothing is "unjust". Thus, from our first societies/associations listed by Aristotle to the last, none have society of any level as an end, but strictly as a means to one's individual, personal end. Each man exists by nature for himself. Therefore, none of the associations/societies are natural. Man is not naturally a social/political animal.

The state, or commonwealth, is a contrivance of man where he, with other men, in order to escape the state of nature where men live in perpetual fear for their life, surrender their natural rights to the state and its sovereign. Therefore, those natural rights leave the individual men and are transferred completely to the sovereign of the commonwealth. Then what he desires is "good", what he detests is "evil", and no one can say otherwise for their rights have become forfeit. It is only in the commonwealth that those "laws of nature" come to be and are enforced.

For the laws of nature, as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and, in sum, doing to others, as we would be done to, of themselves, without the terror of some power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. [emphasis added]

‒Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan, chapter 17.

Thus rights precede law. And virtue, Aristotle's "good life", is not an end or the good of man, but is contrary to his nature.

Crucifixion from Weingarten Missal, c. 1210

Analysis: Who is right?

Where does one begin in the comparative analysis with these two who are apparent polar opposites? Their doctrines are diametrically opposed at the level of principle. Aristotle holds that man is by nature a social animal, and that (political) society exists for the sake of the common good of man: happiness, which is the virtuous life. Hobbes holds than man is a social animal by artifice, that he is naturally an individualistic and antisocial animal, and that political society exists to keep men from killing each other. For Hobbes, the "good" is relative to the individual who calls it so, and virtue is unnatural. It has been noted:

Ethical relativism cannot possibly be the basis for a good democracy because it is inherently incapable of providing a blueprint for unity or an inspiration for decency. Nor can it provide a basis for either tolerance or mutual respect.²¹

One can assert this not just for democracy but for all forms of government. The Christian man can certainly see this. But Hobbes was a Christian and Aristotle a pagan, yet the above quotation would far more resonate with our classical philosopher than our "Christian" legal positivist. What can account for this? Can there be a reconciliation?

As stated above, Aristotle and Hobbes disagree on the level of principle. For two or more people to have a rational dialogue, they must find some common ground from which to commence. If they cannot agree on anything, then no dialogue can ensue ‒they will end up talking past each other. Where is the common ground with our two philosophers?

Aristotle thinks we can have some real knowledge of immaterial realities; not so for Hobbes. Aristotle holds that natures and ends are proportionate and commensurate with each other; for Hobbes, natures and ends are opposed (at least the natures and ends that Aristotle propose are opposed, according to Hobbes). Aristotle thinks man can work for virtue and the state helps him achieve this; Hobbes thinks man works for himself and the state imposes "virtue" on his contrarian nature. Aristotle recognizes that man can, and often is, vicious, but nature is still good, for man's proper end remains²²; Hobbes effectively asserts that man's fallen or wounded nature is not fallen or wounded, but is nature (this, of course, opens up many theological problems, not the least of which is our necessity of the Incarnation, Passion & Death, Resurrection, and Ascension of Our Lord) . Aristotle has been called the realist, and in his works we see that he always proceeds from the more known (the sensible order) to the less known (that which is metaphysica). Hobbes has been called an empiricist, and that we proceed from the senses, but we never really (nor can we with any real meaning) intellectually go beyond the sensible order. Perhaps this is a common ground: sensible experience; for both Aristotle and Hobbes would agree that it is at this level we must begin our rational investigations. But experience can also be a difficult place to start.

It is difficult to argue with a man's experiences. There is no altruism for Hobbes. Why? Perhaps he never experienced it; perhaps he never practiced it himself. A brief look into his biography might allow for this possibility. If a man puts on a coat, he does so to get or keep warm. If he takes off his coat and puts it around his daughter's shoulders, he does so that she may be warm, though he might suffer a little. Hobbes would look for a selfish motive in this. But any decent father would say that he did this strictly for the good of the daughter, at the sacrifice of his own good, not for praise or fear of punishment. Most fathers would call this a simple act of love: an act where the good of another is sought. But if Hobbes never experienced anything like this himself, his conclusions, then, should not be too surprising. However, if Hobbes ever did experience anything like this, his whole edifice instantly becomes a house of cards. His modernity, then, becomes contrived and forced, and he thus violates his own principles of starting from sensible experience. Which is it? We cannot see into his soul to know.

But there are experiences that all men can work from. Firstly, all men want to be happy. Men certainly do disagree in what happiness consists, but that is a disagreement on the particulars; a general conception of happiness remains. But it is observable that we do not act for the sake of mere survival. Secondly, Aristotle's observations still holds true: individual men are insufficient in themselves. Man does not regenerate from division like earthworms, he requires a partner of the opposite sex to propagate the species ‒this is indisputable fact. He does not need arguments to see this; this is on the level of the self evident (in spite of the non-arguments of today's generation). And it is observed that to achieve the first point, man regularly seeks to alleviate the second. Again, he does not need rational prompting to see this, he does so, dare we say, by nature. Thus, when people get married and bind themselves to this fundamental society, they have happiness as a goal. If this is granted, Aristotle's arguments must then be conceded. Man, logically then, must go out of himself to achieve happiness; he must must be societal in order to be happy. When he fails to do so, he is miserable (and in this selfish, post-Hobbesian age, that failure in social behavior explains the terribly high divorce and abortion rates). The Hobbesian order does not allow for happiness, it merely exchanges one misery for another. The one addition a Christian man would want to make to the Aristotelian doctrine is that man's ultimate happiness lies in beatitude which is in part achieved by the virtuous life. But beatitude is a supernatural end. Nonetheless, even in beatitude there is society, the society of the creature in the presence of the Creator in Whose image he was made. Man's happiness, the perfection of his nature, then, is not only achieved through society, it is Society.

Finis.

ENDNOTES

1Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan, part 1, chapter 13, page 100.

2Aristotle. Politics, 1253a, 20-25.

3St. Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on Aristotle's Politics, chapter 1, commentary at 6, page 9.

4Aristotle. Politics, 1252a25-1253a3.

5ibid. 1252b 28-1253a 3.

6ibid. 1253a, 3-20.

7Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan, part 1, chapter 2, page 23.

8ibid. chapter 9, page 69.

9ibid. chapter 3, page 29.

10ibid. chapter 6, page 54.

11ibid. chapter 4, page 37.

12ibid. page 39.

13ibid. chapter 5, page 41.

14ibid. page 43.

15ibid. chapter 11, page 85.

16ibid. chapter 13, page 98.

17cf. the entire 13th chapter of Leviathan.

18Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan, chapter 13, page 99.

19cf. the entire 14th chapter of Leviathan.

20Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan, chapter 14, page 103.

21Dr. Donald DeMarco. From an article contained in the syllabus for the Political Philosophy class for Holy Apostles College and Seminary (HACS PHL712: Political Philosophy Fall 2011).

22Aristotle has some level of recognition of the fallen or wounded nature of man as expressed in the Christian tradition. In spite of this, and though man is often vicious, his nature is still ordered to the end which is good. Even when performing vicious acts, men do not seek evil qua evil, but they seek it due to a misappropriated or lesser good perceived.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aquinas, St. Thomas. Commentary on Aristotle's Politics, Richard Regan (translator), Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2007.

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, Hippocrates Apostle (translator), Grinnell, Iowa: The Peripatetic Press, 1984.

______. Politics, Hippocrates Apostle (translator), Grinnell, Iowa: The Peripatetic Press, 1986.

______. Politics: A Treatise on Government, William Ellis (translator), Project Gutenberg, June 5, 2009 [EBook #6762]. November 1, 2011 <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/6762/6762-h/6762-h.htm>.

Hobbes, Thomas. The English Works of Thomas Hobbes ‒ The Elements of Philosophy: Concerning Body, Sir William Molesworth (ed.), London: John Bohn, 1839. Internet Archive, April 1, 2008. November 2, 2011 <http://www.archive.org/stream/englishworkstho21hobbgoog#page/n36/mode/2up>.

______. Leviathan, Michael Oakeshott (editor), New York: Collier Books, 1962.

______. Leviathan, Edward White and David Widger (production), Project Gutenberg, October 11, 2009 [EBook #3207]. November 2, 2011 <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm#2HCH0017>.

DeMarco, Donald, Ph.D. "Syllabus for HACS PHL712: Political Philosophy Fall 2011", November 3, 2011 <http://fishersnet.blackboard.com/bbcswebdav/pid-486319-dt-content-rid-25669_1/courses/HACS_D_PHL712_Fall_2011/Political_Philosophy_Syllabus2.pdf>.